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ABSTRACT 
According  to  prov~s~ons of the 1990 U.S.  farm bill,  the export enhancement 
program  (EEP)  will continue  to be  an  important  instrument  in promoting U.S. 
agricultural exports  and  in challenging subsidizing competitors,  like the 
European Community  (EC),  with funding  levels set at a  minimum  of $500  million 
annually  through 1995.  This  research,  whose  purpose  is to evaluate  the likely 
effectiveness of the wheat  EEP  through 1995,  reaches  several conclusions:  (1) 
the  EEP  will have  a  significant effect on U.S.  wheat exports,  but will be 
subject to diminishing returns at levels higher  than the annual minimums;  and 
(2)  the  EC  will only be marginally affected by the  EEP,  that is, it can 
effectively counter  the effects of the  EEP  at low cost. 
Keywords:  export subsidies,  export enhancement program,  agricultural trade, 
simulation model,  wheat,  coarse grains 
/ THE  EXPORT  ENHANCEMENT  PROGRAM: 
PROSPECTS  UNDER  THE  FOOD,  AGRICULTURE,  CONSERVATION, 
AND  TRADE  ACT  OF  1990 
The  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  is perceived by U.S.  policymakers  to be 
an  important factor  in expanding U.S.  agricultural exports.  Bonuses  for sales 
of EEP  commodities  totaled $3.1 billion from  September  1985  through January 
1991.  In writing the  Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and Trade Act of 1990 
(FACT),  policymakers  specified that the  Commodity  Credit Corporation  (CCC)  is 
to provide  $500  million or more  yearly in CCC  funds  or commodities  to carry 
out the  EEP  in order to discourage unfair  trade practices by making U.S. 
agricultural commodities  competitive in world markets.  In addition,  the  1990 
Budget Reconciliation Act requires  an additional  $1  billion in export programs 
(not necessarily the  EEP)  for  the period beginning October  1993  through 
September  1995  if the United States fails  to enter into a  General Agreement  on 
Tariffs and Trade  (GATT)  agreement by  the  end of September  1992. 
Although  favored by policymakers,  the  EEP  has  not received much  support  from 
economists.  Writing in Choices  R.  Paarlberg has  argued that the  EEP  has  done 
more  to displace U.S.  commercial  exports  than it has  to build exports. 
Coughlin and Carraro  (1988)  note  ironically that it probably would have been 
as beneficial to  farmers  and certainly more  cost effective in the shortrun to 
destroy  "excess" wheat  in U.S.  government  stocks  than use it as  in-kind 
bonuses  in promoting exports.  Other studies,  surveyed by Seitzinger and  P. 
Paarlberg  (1989),  indicate that the  EEP  expanded wheat exports between 10  and 
30  percent for  the 1986/87  crop year,  and between 7  and  14 percent for  the 
1 1987/88  crop year. 1  These  studies  show  only slight increases  in the U.S. 
wheat price due  to  the  EEP.  After  taking into consideration the value of 
commodities  from  government  inventories  awarded  to exporters under  the  EEP, 
net export revenues  due  to  the  EEP  increased less  than one percent.  More 
recently,  Anania  and others  (1991)  model  the  EEP  as  an in-kind,  targeted 
subsidy program,  constrained by available wheat  stocks  in CCC  inventories. 
Their results  show  only a  small  increase in U.S.  wheat exports  due  to the 
program.  Further,  they  find the  EEP  to be very expensive,  and that the 
European Community  (EC)  is only slightly harmed by  the program. 
Tracing the effect of the  EEP  is a  complicated process.  If the  EEP  were  simply 
a  cash export subsidy,  then the predicted effect would be  simple:  the  EEP 
would  expand exports by raising the domestic price of wheat  and  lowering the 
world price.  However,  to  the maximum  extent possible,  EEP  is an in-kind 
subsidy program.  Exporters  are  awarded  EEP  bonuses  in the  form  of commodity 
certificates which may  be  sold or exchanged for  CCC-owned  commodities.  Cash 
subsidies are authorized but have not been used.  Released stocks  expand 
available supply and have price-depressing effects.  In this vein,  Houck  (1986) 
and more  lately,  Chambers  and Paarlberg  (1991),  show  that in-kind subsidies  to 
middlemen  (that is,  exporters)  have  ambiguous  price effects.  If the  excess 
demand  is elastic,  then the  subsidy effect outweighs  the  stock-release effect, 
and  the  domestic price will rise. 
An  evaluation of the  EEP  is also complicated by  the workings  of U.S.  commodity 
lThese  studies  include  those by Bailey  (1989),  Haley  (1989),  and Hillberg 
(1988). 
2 programs.  A change  in the domestic wheat price affects the  incentive to 
participate in the  government's  commodity program.  If the domestic wheat price 
were  to rise,  reduced program participation would  imply less  land diverted 
from wheat production under  the  acreage  reduction program  (ARP).  Increased 
supply would lead to expanded exports  and more private stocks.  Also,  as 
described below,  the  FACT  explicitly relates ARP's  and Findley loan rate 
adjustments  to stock-to-use ratios.  In-kind EEP  bonuses directly reduce 
government stocks,  but reduced ARP's  and higher effective loan rates could 
mitigate or reverse this effect over  time. 
The  purpose of this research is to  analyze  the probable effects of the wheat 
EEP  over  the course of the  FACT,  that is,  1991-95.  The  focus  is on an 
evaluation of the  EEP  in meeting its explicit goals of promoting exports  and 
challenging "unfair"  competition.  The  effect on net export revenue will be 
considered as well.  Net export revenue  is interpreted as  the  increase in 
exports evaluated at world prices less  the cost of the program,  taking into 
account  the effect on deficiency payments. 
As  seems  evident above,  evaluating the effect of the  EEP  is an empirical 
matter.  The  approach  in this paper situates the  EEP  into  a  simple,  yet 
thorough,  modeling  framework  that accounts  for  the  dynamics  of U.S.  and  EC 
grain commodity programs  in the context of production uncertainties.  Detailed 
attention to policy mechanisms  in a  dynamic  setting distinguishes this 
modeling approach  from  those  described above  except for  that of Bailey.  Unlike 
Bailey,  however,  the analysis is future-directed.  Because variations in 
domestic  and foreign crop yields  (and hence production levels)  can directly 
3 affect U.S.  wheat export performance,  the model  is in a  stochastic framework 
that explicitly recognizes yield deviations  from yield growth trends.  This 
specification is discussed below. 
This paper is organized into several sections.  The  next section discusses  the 
background of the  EEP,  including the criteria by which po1icymakers meant  for 
it to be  judged.  Because  the operations of the  EEP  will take place in the 
context of other U.S.  government  commodity programs,  the  following section 
discusses major provisions  of the  FACT  besides  the  EEP.  Next,  an outline of 
the model  constructed for  the  analysis  is presented.  The  base model  run is 
then examined,  and then results  from various  EEP  scenarios are presented and 
discussed in order to  reach some  probabilistic conclusions  about  the  EEP  over 
1991-95. 
The  Export  Enhancement  Program 
Export subsidies have  long been used to promote U.S.  agricultural exports. 
Authorizations  for  export price subsidies  came  from  Section 32  of the 
Agricultural Act  of 1935  and the  1948  CCC  Charter authority.  Included in 
export price subsidies are:  cash and  in-kind payments  to exporters  and 
producers,  and sales at "world market prices"  from  CCC  inventories. 
Government-assisted commercial  exports with an export payment  averaged $980 
million per year,  or  24 percent of the value of total agricultural exports, 
during 1956-60.  During 1961-65  these  government assisted exports  increased to 
an average  of $1,144 million  (21 percent of the total).  The  1966-70 yearly 
4 average was  $1,087  mi11ion.2  The  highest yearly amount was  $2,496 million in 
1973  (about  17  percent of the total).  After 1973  the subsidies dropped off 
markedly until the mid-1980's. 
As  part of its strategy to revive U.S.  agricultural exports after significant 
declines experienced in the early 1980's,  the United States established the 
EEP  in May  1985  under  the authority of the eee  Charter Act of 1948.  The  EEP 
was  subsequently reauthorized by  the  Food Security Act  of 1985.  There have 
been a  number  of criteria which  guide  the administration of the program.  Each 
EEP  offer must have  the potential to  develop,  increase,  or maintain markets 
for U.S.  agricultural commodities.  EEP  subsidies  should help U.S.  exporters 
displace  the  exports of subsidizing competitors  in specific countries,  but it 
should not have  more  than a  minimal effect on nonsubsidizing competitors. 
Finally,  the overall  EEP  program level and subsidies  for  individual  EEP  sales 
should be maintained at the minimum  budget level necessary to  achieve  the 
EEP's  trade policy and export expansion goals. 
Wheat  has  accounted for over  80  percent of the value of all EEP-assisted 
sales.  80.7 million metric  tons  of wheat were  sold under  the  EEP  from 
September  1985  through  the beginning of January 1991.  Other commodities  that 
have  received export subsidies under  the  EEP  include:  barley,  barley malt, 
wheat flour,  semolina,  sorghum,  rice,  poultry feed,  vegetable oil,  frozen 
poultry,  dairy cattle,  and table eggs. 
2Export  payments  were  also made  to exporters  on P.L.  480 Title  I  sales at 
world  market  prices.  In  some  years  these  payments  increase  the  "exports  with 
payments"  significantly.  See  appendix  table  2  of Ackerman and  Smith  (1990). 
5 Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and  Trade  Act  of 1990 
Operations  of the  EEP  will be  conducted in a  policy environment different from 
that which prevailed over  1986-90.  The  FACT,  along the  1990  Budget 
Reconciliation Act,  changes  the ways  some  government policy parameters  are 
set,  and  in general is designed to  reduce  government budget expenditure on 
commodity programs  and  introduce more  flexibility into farmers'  cropping 
choices.  Although  there are many  facets  to  the  FACT,  only those major 
provisions which are actually included  (or potentially could be  included)  in 
the model  employed  in this  study are  described below. 
The  main provisions of the  FACT  are  summarized  in table 1.  Minimum  target 
prices are  frozen at 1990  levels  through  1995.  Deficiency payments  are 
calculated as  under  the  Food Security Act of 1985  (FSA).  Program payment 
yields are set at the  same  levels as  in 1990,  although USDA  is authorized to 
set them at the average  of the preceding 5  years'  harvested yield,  excluding 
high and  low years.  Base  acreage  (BASE)  is the average of acreage planted or 
considered planted for  the previous  five years. 
As  in the  1985  FSA,  wheat  and coarse grain base  loan rates will be  85  percent 
of a  5-year moving  average of market prices,  excluding high and  low years. 
Base  loan rates cannot fall more  than  5  percent  from  the previous year's base 
loan rate.  The  Secretary of Agriculture can reduce  the  loan rate up  to  an 
additional  10 percent in order to maintain market  competitiveness  of U.S. 
exports.  (Under  the  FSA,  the authorization level was  20  percent.)  The  loan 
rate can also be  reduced if certain stocks-to-use ratios occur.  For wheat,  if 
6 Table  1--U.S.  Policy Parameters  for  Base  FACT  Model 
Target price  (TP): 
Wheat  - $146.97  per metric  ton 
Coarse grain =  $108.26  per metric  ton 
Loan rate: 
Base  Loan Rate  (LR)  - Max  (85%  of 5  year moving  average of market price, 
excluding high and  low,  95%  of previous year's  loan rate) 
Findley adjustment  (FDLY)-
10%  at the discretion of the  Secretary of Agriculture; 
plus  5%  if stocks-to-use ratio exceeds  15%  for wheat  and  12.5%  for coarse 
grain;  and 
plus additional  5%  if stocks-to-use ratio exceeds  30%  for wheat  and  25%  for 
coarse grain. 
Acreage reduction program  (ARP): 
Wheat:  if stocks-to-use ratio exceeds  40%,  ARP  - 20%,  otherwise ARP  - 10%, 
except for  1991,  ARP  =  15%; 
Coarse grains:  if stocks-to-use ratio exceeds  25%,  ARP 
5%,  except for  1991,  ARP  =  7.5% 
Flex acreage  (FLEX): 
Wheat  and coarse grains:  1991-95:  15% 
Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEPTOT): 
20%,  otherwise ARP  -
CCC  to provide  $500  million or more  (in CCC  funds  or commodities)  annually 
(Model  assumes  that  75%  or  $375  million used for wheat exports annually.) 
Program Yield  (PY): 
Wheat  =  2.35281 mt/hectare,  and coarse grain  5.42300 mtjhectare. 
7 the ratio falls between 15  and  30  percent,  the  loan rate may  be  reduced by  5 
percent.  If the ratio is over  30  percent,  the  loan rate may  be  reduced by as 
much  as  10 percent.  For coarse grains,  the  5  percent reduction requires  a 
stocks-to-use ratio between 12.5  and  25  percent.  The  10 percent reduction is 
possible if the ratio exceeds  25  percent. 
A new  provision included in the  FACT  relates the size of wheat  and coarse 
grain acreage reduction requirements,  or ARP's,  to carryover supplies  in 
relation to use  (that is,  stocks-to-use ratios)  at the  end of the preceding 
marketing year.  The  wheat  ARP  can range  from  zero  to  15 percent for  a  stocks-
to-use ratio at or below 40  percent and  from  10  to  20  percent for  a  stocks-to-
use ratio above  40  percent.  The  coarse grains ARP  (except for oats)  can range 
from  zero  to 12.5 percent for  a  stocks-to-use ratio at or below  25  percent and 
from  10  to  20  percent for  a  ratio above  25  percent.  Table  1  shows  the ARP 
decision rules used in the model.  Maximum  ARP's  for wheat  and coarse grains 
are limited to  20  percent.  Special rates  apply for  1991.  The  1991 wheat ARP 
cannot be less than 15 percent,  and  the  corn ARP  cannot be less than 7.5 
percent. 
Flex or triple base  acreage  are acres not eligible for  deficiency payments. 
Fifteen percent of base acreage becomes  flex acreage  for each of the program 
crops.  Flex acres are covered by special planting flexibility provisions.  Any 
program crop,  including the original crop  to which  the base applies,  or 
oilseed can be planted on  the flex acreage.  Nonprogram crops,  excluding fruits 
and vegetables,  can be planted on the flex acreage.  Price  support loan loans, 
if available,  can be  received for  the  program crops  grown on  the flex acreage. 
8 As  along as  only approved crops  are planted on flex acreage,  flex acreage is 
considered to be planted to  the original crop  for purposes  of determining base 
acreage  in succeeding years. 
The  Model 
The  model  used in this study was  created to analyze policy alternatives for 
grains  in the United States  and  the  EC.  (A  technical discussion of the 
modeling structure is in the  appendix to  this paper.)  The  model  incorporates 
the major provisions of the  FACT,  including those that determine  target 
prices,  loan rates,  acreage reduction requirements,  flex acreage,  minimum 
funding  levels  for  the  EEP,  and other policy parameters.  The  EC  model 
component  incorporates  intervention and  threshold pricing mechanisms.  The 
operation of these mechanisms  in the model  provide  estimates of expenditures 
on export restitutions,  and  on  import and producer coresponsibility levies. 
The  model  includes  grain sectors for  the Soviet Union  (U.S.S.R.)  and  the Rest-
of-the-World  (ROW). 
The  model  is synthetic in the  sense  that its structure and many  of its 
parameter values are based on agricultural trade mvdels  that have been used at 
the  Economic  Research Service  (ERS)  of the  USDA  in examining  the effects 
worldwide  trade liberalization and other policy scenarios.  Supply and demand 
elasticity values used in the model  (a  and  ~,  respectively)  are derived from 
those used in Roningen  and Dixit's TLIB-SWOPSIM  model  (1989)  and as  documented 
by Sullivan,  Wainio,  and Roningen  (1989).  All model elasticities are  shown  in 
Table  2.  The  modeling structure of U.S.  and  EC  policy is based on Magiera and 
9 Table  2--Mode1  elasticities 
Acreage plantedfharvested 
United States  European Community  Rest-of-World 
WH1  CG  SB  WH  CG  SB  WH  CG  SB 
WH  0.57  -.31  .05  .45  -.21  0  .37  -.09  .01 
CG  - .09  .47  - .07  -.28  .44  0  - .09  .40  - .03 
SB  .03  -.15  .48  0  0  .30  .02  -.07  .39 
Demand 
WH  CG  SB  WH  CG  SB  WH  CG  SB 
WH  -.35  .25  0  -.26  .13  0  -.30  .06  0 
CG  .05  - .17  .02  .14  -.26  .01  .06  -.34  .01 
SB  0  .09  -.31  0  .01  - .15  0  .17  -.50 
Private stocks2 
WH  CG  SB  WH  CG  SB  WH  CG  SB 
WH  ·-1.5  - .5 
CG  -1. 5  -.5 
SB  -1. 5  -.5 
1  WH  - Wheat,  CG  - Coarse Grains,  and  SB  =  Soybeans. 
2  Elasticity defined with respect to current price/expected price 
Herlihy's  refinement at the  Economic  Research Service  (ERS)  of an earlier 
model  developed by Magiera for  the Organization for  Economic  Cooperation and 
Development  (1985).  The  model's  dynamic  and stochastic structure is based on 
the work of Holland and Sharples  (1984).  Stock elasticities  (p)  are  from 
Holland and Sharples  as well. 
10 Figure  l--Dynamic  Structure of the  Model 
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11 The  model  tracks  supply and utilization of wheat,  major coarse grains  (corn, 
sorghum,  barley,  and oats),  and soybeans  over the period 1989  through 1995.3 
The  dynamic  schema is shown  in figure  1.  Supply,  utilization,  price,  and 
policy data  from  1989  are used to calibrate the  model  so that the model will 
reproduce  these variable values  for  1989.  Producers,  consumers,  and policy-
implementers  jointly determine  the course of these variables  through 1995. 
Consumers  and policy-implementers  follow  complex but fixed decision rules 
represented as model  equations.  Consumption  demand  is specified to  increase 
proportionally to projected increases  in population.  Producers  follow a  set of 
rules  as well but are constrained by  a  lack of knowledge  of prices  to be 
received from  the sale of their product each year.  They  form  expectations 
based on previous years'  prices.  Based on  these expectations,  they decide how 
much  acreage  to plant and harvest. 
Producers  and policymakers  form  expectations regarding yields.  In the United 
States,  expected yields are  important  in determining participation in 
government  commodity programs.  Although program yields  (upon which deficiency 
payments  are determined)  are fixed,  actual yields  influence per hectare market 
returns  and  the value of domestic price supports  through nonrecourse  loans. 
Expected yields in the model  are projections  from  1990  to  1995 based on linear 
regression equations  in which actual yields  from  1975  through  1989  were 
regressed on  time. 
Actual yields,  along with acreage plantedfharvested decisions made  by 
3Discussion  of  the  soybean  sector,  except  for  presentation  of  model 
elasticities, is more or less suppressed in this report. Modeling results dealing 
with EEP  scenarios have little effect on the supply and utilization of soybeans. 
12 producers,  determine actual production.  Wheat yields over  1990-95  are 
generated from  a  normal distribution whose  mean  equals  the  expected wheat 
yield for  a  particular year  and  a  standard deviation equaling the standard 
error of the corresponding regression equation from which  the  expected yield 
was  derived.  The  same  procedure is followed for coarse grains,  but the 
correlation between coarse grain and wheat yields over 1975-89  is used to 
determine  the  coarse grain yields  in the model.  (See  appendix for  an explicit 
representation of the relationship).  Each model  iteration corresponds  to  a 
sequence of crop yields  from  1990  to  1995  for all model  regions. 
There  are  two  modeling aspects  to  the  EEP.  The  first is its role as  an export 
subsidy.  What  is presumed to be  known  at the beginning of the marketing year 
is how  much  is available to be  spent on the  EEP  (that is,  EEPTOT),  and  the 
extent of actual production  (PR).  This  information is used to calculate a 
price wedge  (EEPTOT/PR)  which becomes  the difference between the U.S.  domestic 
wheat price and  the world price. 
The  second aspect is related to  the  EEP's  effect on  government controlled CCC 
stocks.  As  discussed earlier,  EEP  is an  in-kind subsidy program.  The  model 
calculates government wheat  and coarse grain stocks  available for  in-kind 
payments at the beginning of the crop year.  (There  is  a  four million metric 
ton  (mmt)  emergency  food  reserve constraining the availability of wheat 
stocks.)  If stocks  are projected to be  insufficient for  the payments,  cash 
subsidies will be paid  (as  the  FACT  specifies).  The  model  assumes  that 
commodity certificates are  redeemed for wheat before being redeemed for  the 
coarse grains.  The  model  specifies that CCC  stocks  are replenished through an 
13 equation relating the wheat price and  loan rate to  loan forfeitures  to  the 
ccc. 
Other  "blocks"  of the model  determine production in the  other model  regions. 
Table  3  summarizes  key assumptions  and relationships representing EC  grain 
policies.  The  simultaneous  model  block includes  equations  determining 
consumption and carryover stocks.  A region's  commodity  trade balance  is 
calculated as  a  residual:  beginning stocks plus production less  consumption 
and ending stocks.  Commodity  prices are determined in world market clearing 
trade equations  for each commodity. 
Base  Run  Results 
In order to analyze  the effect of the  EEP,  several versions  of the model  are 
run.  Each of these versions differ in their assumptions  regarding the  EEP 
funding  levels over  1991-95.  Model  results  from  these several versions are 
compared to  a  base run of the model.  These  comparisons  are closely examined in 
the next section of this report.  The  base run results are described in this 
section. 
Table  4  shows  average world prices  for wheat  and coarse grains.  There  is 
decidedly downward drift of wheat prices,  while  coarse grains prices fluctuate 
in the  low  $120/mt  range.  u.s.  supply and utilization model  results are  shown 
in Table  5.  Wheat  exports lie in the  low-to-mid  30  mmt  range,  while  coarse 
grain exports  show  consistent growth  (up  to  77  mmt)  throughout  the period.  A 
general  tendency is a  build-up  in ending stock levels.  The  wheat  stocks-to-use 
14 Table  3--EC  Common  Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  for  the model 
Intervention price  (guaranteed minimum  EC  price): 
Wheat  - 179.44 ecu per metric  ton 
Coarse grain - 170.47  ecu per metric  ton 
Threshold price  (EC  import price): 
Wheat  - 245.68  ecu per metric  ton 
Coarse grain - 223.38  ecu per metric  ton 
Coresponsibi1ity levy rate: 
Base  - 3%  of intervention price 
Additional:  if wheat  and coarse grain grain production sum  to over 
160 million metric  tons,  additional percentage points  added 
to base  levy rate to produce  maximum  of  6%  of intervention price 
for next crop year 
EC  producer  incentive price 
Max[(l-coresponsibility levy rate)*intervention price,  ecu world price] 
Export  refunds  -
Exports  to non-EC  countries*[intervention price  - ecu world price] 
Import  levy -
Imports*[threshold price  - ecu world price] 
Storage payments  =  f(production) 
Gross  budget expenditure  =  export refunds +  storage payments 
Net budget expenditure -
gross budget expenditure  - [coresponsibi1ity and  import levies] 
ratio grows  from  26  percent in 1991  to  51  percent in 1995.  Over  the  same 
period,  the  coarse grains ratio grows  from  22  to  34  percent.  Increased ARP's 
15 Table  4--Model Results:  World  Grain Prices 
Wheat  Coarse  Grain 
Year  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Deviation 
Dollars per metric  ton 
1991  162.91  17.53  123.86  13.35 
1992  154.93  13.77  132.81  14.06 
1993  154.94  9.56  123.73  10.73 
1994  146.39  9.44  125.27  10.13 
1995  147.43  9.79  121.41  11.41 
do  not curtail production sufficiently to limit the  growth in stocks. 
Table  6  shows  EC  supply and utilization,  and table  7  shows  results for  EC 
wheat budget expenditures.  The  growth  in EC  production and exports  (given 
fairly stationary demand)  outstrips that of the United States.  As  mentioned 
above,  the model  assumes  that average yields  grow  in line with trends  from  the 
1975-89 period.  EC  growth  trends are  3.46 percent for wheat,  and 2.44 percent 
for coarse grains,  while  the  corresponding trends  for  the United States are 
1.14 percent for wheat,  and 1.61 percent for  coarse grains.  EC 
coresponsibility levies  do  not effectively limit the  growth of EC  production. 
High budgetary exposure  associated with production growth may  be  a  force  for 
EC  reform  independent of the  EEP  effect described below. 
Evaluation of EEP  Alternatives 
16 Table  5--Base Run  Results:  U.S.  Supply and Utilization 
Year  Prod  Cons  Exports  Stock  Ending 
Change  Stocks 
Million metric  tons 
Wheat 
1991  61. 574  28.436  31.302  1.837  15.649 
1992  66.186  29.855  31.138  5.193  20.842 
1993  65.648  29.414  34.794  1.440  22.282 
1994  68.507  30.440  31.189  6.878  29.160 
1995  65.454  30.253  32.276  2.926  32.086 
Coarse  Grains 
1991  260.621  174.910  59.619  26.091  51.420 
1992  242.160  173.103  70.669  -1. 612  49.808 
1993  264.711  176.955  70.526  17.230  67.039 
1994  260.177  177.123  76.410  6.643  73.682 
1995  270.470  179.743  77.257  13.470  87.151 
Prod  =  Production,  and  Cons  - Consumption. 
The  effect of the  EEP  is analyzed by  running  the model  for  four  alternative 
EEP  specifications  and examining model  results for each of the  scenarios 
relative to  the base  run.  The  base  run assumes  that the  EEP  is funded at the 
yearly minimum  $500 million level and that 75  percent of available  EEP  funds 
are used to promote wheat.  No  EEP  bonuses  are used to promote  coarse grains. 
The  four alternative assumptions  regarding the  EEP  are  as  follows: 
Scenario A  -- EEP  funding  is set at zero  for  1991-95.  Comparison with 
base results permits  an analysis of the minimum  EEP  funding levels. 
Scenario B  -- EEP  funding  is assumed to  increase  to  $900  million/year. 
17 Table  6--Base  Run  Results:  EC  Supply and Utilization 
Year  Prod  Cons  Exports  Stock  Ending 
Change  Stocks 
Million metric  tons 
Wheat 
1991  82.893  58.809  23.429  .655  14.180 
1992  85.720  58.976  26.010  .734  14.915 
1993  88.533  59.230  29.441  - .138  14.777 
1994  91.470  59.395  31. 745  .330  15.107 
1995  95.190  59.543  35.963  -.315  14.792 
Coarse Grains 
1991  80.609  76.633  2.487  1.489  10.424 
1992  82.205  76.927  4.774  .504  10.927 
1993  84.259  77.107  7.363  - .211  10.717 
1994  86.302  77.287  8.668  .347  11. 064 
1995  88.881  77 .476  11.688  -.283  10.781 
75  percent is allocated to wheat  exports. 
Scenario  C  -- Same  as  scenario  B except that there is assumed  increased 
funding  for  crop years  1993  and  1994  due  to  a  presumed inability to 
reach a  GATT  agreement by  30  September  1992.  The  billion dollar 
allocation is assumed applied to  the wheat  EEP  equiproportiona11y over 
the  two-year period. 
Scenario  D -- Same  as  scenario C,  plus  an elimination of wheat  and 
coarse grains ARP's  for  1993  and  1994  crop years.  Before  the  FACT  became 
law,  there had been much  discussion regarding the elimination of ARP's 
18 Table  7--Base  Run  Results:  EC  Wheat  Budget 
Export Refunds  Gross  Budget  Net  Budget 
Year  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Deviation  Deviation 
Millions  of ECU's 
1991  1,346  421  2,190  451  1,445  511 
1992  1,640  405  2,513  446  1,696  530 
1993  1,813  322  2,715  359  1,799  435 
1994  2,157  419  3,089  465  2,111  490 
1995  2,376  441  3,346  483  2,330  497 
in these years  in order to put additional budget pressure  on  the  CAP. 
Table  8  shows  model  results in terms  of ratios relative to  the base  run for 
production,  exports,  prices,  and  EC  budget components.  Table  9  shows  results 
for  export revenue  levels,  and table  10  shows  results for  increases  in EC 
restitutions in terms  of levels and also relative to u.S.  wheat  EEP 
expenditure. 
Model  results:  Scenario A and Base 
Model  results indicate that the base level of  EEP  funding  increases U.S.  wheat 
exports  relative to  no  EEP  as  follows:  1991-7.4 percent,  1992-14.8 percent, 
1993-15.1 percent,  1994-21.1 percent,  and 1995-22.2 percent.  First year 
effects are not as high as  subsequent years because  there is no first year 
19 Table  8--Model results:  EEP  scenarios 
Scenario A  Scenario B  Scenario  C  Scenario D 
Variable va1ue:EEP  scenario/variable va1ue:base  FACT  scenario 




























































































































































Scenario A-No  EEP;  Scenario  B=Maximum  EEP;  Scenario  C=Same  as  B plus  $500 
million in 1993  & 1994;  and Scenario  D=Same  as  C plus  ARP-O  in 93  & 94 
20 Table  9--Model results:  effect of EEP  on U.S.  export revenue 
Base  Scenario A  Scenario B  Scenario  C  Scenario D 
Net  export revenue for wheat1 
Billions of dollars 
1991  4.725  4.790  4.616  4.616  4.616 
1992  4.449  4.201  4.497  4.497  4.497 
1993  5.016  4.740  5.045  4.786  4.9532 
1994  4.191  3.852  4.192  4.119  4.615 
1995  4.384  4.027  4.465  4.414  4.748 
Total  22.765  21. 610  22.815  22.432  23.429 
Scenario A - No  EEP 
Scenario B  Maximum  EEP  payments 
Scenario  C - Maximum  EEP  payments  plus  $500  million in 1993  & 1994 
Scenario  D  Same  as  scenario C plus ARP  - 0  in 1993  & 1994 
1  Net  export revenue  =  Export  revenue valued at world price + Deficiency 
payment  savings relative to base  - EEP  cost 
2Net  export revenue  for  1993  and 1994 - Export  ~evenue valued at world price + 
Deficiency payment  savings  from  scenario C  - additic;mal wheat deficiency 
payments  due  to ARP- EEP  cost;  Increased wheat deficiency payments  due  to ARP, 
1993:  $111  million,  and 1994:  $36  million. 
production effect in the model.  (Recall that production is a  function of 
lagged prices  instead of current prices.  It is likely that farmers' 
expectations would adapt more  quickly than what  is specified;  therefore,  it 
could be  argued that the first year export effect is lower  than what it should 
be. ) 
Cumulative  1991-95 wheat  exports are  22  mmt  greater than without  the  EEP  (161 
mmt  compared to  139  mmt).  Yearly U.S.  wheat prices  average between 1  and  2.3 
21 Table  10--Mode1  results:  effect of EEP  on  EC  restitutions 
Scenario A  Scenario  B  Scenario  C  Scenario 
Increased EC  restitutions1 
Millions  of dollars 
1991  -63.51  36.75  36.75  36.75 
1992  -65.41  41.04  41.04  41.04 
1993  -94.73  56.45  130.64  225.77 
1994  -92.79  50.87  98.87  180.07 
1995  122.80  82.79  54.90  48.19 
Increased EC  restitutions per EEP  dollar 
Dollars 
1991  - 0.169  0.123  0.123  0.123 
1992  -.174  .137  .137  .137 
1993  -.253  .188  .163  .282 
1994  -.247  .170  .124  .225 
1995  -.327  .276  .183  ;;;  .161 
Scenario A - No  EEP 
Scenario  B - Maximum  EEP  payments 
Scenario  C - Maximum  EEP  payments  plus  $500  million in 1993  & 1994 
Scenario D - Same  as  scenario  C plus  ARP  - 0  in 1993  & 1994 
D 
lCumu1ative wheat  and coarse grain export restitutions  (million U.S.  dollars): 
Base=$13,279.37,  Scenario A-$12,840.39,  Scenario B-$13,547.27,  Scenario 
C=$13,64l.57,  and Scenario  D=$13,81l.19. 
percent higher  than what  they would have been without  an EEP.  Likewise,  world 
wheat prices are between 1.5 and 3.0 percent lower  than without an EEP.  Gains 
in net export revenue  (export  revenue  plus  savings  from  decreased deficiency 
payments  due  to higher  EEP-induced U.S.  wheat prices less  the cost of EEP)  are 
$1.155 billion for  the base  EEP.  Considering that $1.875 billion is assumed 
22 spent on  the  EEP  in the base run,  the program  seems  efficient in generating 
additional net export revenue:  a  return of $0.62  for each  EEP  dollar. 
Model  results:  Base  and  Scenarios  B.  C.  and  D 
Increased EEP  funding  above  the minimum  base  levels produce wheat  export 
gains,  but these gains are less relative to  those associated with going  from 
the zero  funding  level to  the minimum.  Increasing EEP  funding by 80  percent 
($375  million to  $675  million:  scenario B)  increases cumulative wheat  exports 
by  12  mmt,  (which  is 54 percent of the  22  mmt  gain of going  from  no  EEP  to  the 
base  level).  The  export gains measured yearly are fairly significant:  between 
4.1 percent  (1991)  and 10.6 percent  (1995).  U.S.  wheat prices are in the area 
of 1.9 percent higher,  while world prices are  about 1.2 percent lower  than in 
the base.  Net export revenue  increases by  only $50  million.  This  increase 
represents  a  marginal  return to additional  EEP  spending relative to  the base 
of 3.3 percent. 
Increased EEP  expenditure  in 1993  and  1994 produces  an additional 4.9  mmt  gain 
in U.S.  wheat exports.  Exports  jump  en additional 6.1 percentage points in 
1993  and  9  percentage points  in 1994.  However,  these  gains  come  at 
considerable cost:  net export  revenue  is less  than in the base. 
Setting the  ARP  to  zero  in 1993  and  1994 produces  a  rise in exports  in those 
years slightly less  than the effect of the  EEP  beyond  the minimum  levels 
assumed in the base.  In 1993  ARP  removal  increases  exports by  8.3 percentage 
points  (expanded-EEP effect in 1993:  13.0 percent).  In 1994  the  ARP  effect is 
23 13.6 percentage points,  compared  to  a  17.0 percent effect from  the  expanded-
EEP.  Over  the entire time  frame,  exports are higher by over  8  mmt  due  to zero 
ARP's.  U.S.  prices decrease  due  to  increased production on  formerly diverted 
land,  especially in 1993.  A drawback  to  ARP  elimination,  all else constant,  is 
that there is likely to be  increased participation in government programs  as  a 
result of reducing  the cost of program participation (that is,  land diversion 
as  a  program requirement).  The  model predicts that wheat deficiency payments 
rise by $147  million,  which  offsets  somewhat  the  two-year rise in export 
revenue.  The  net gain is likely to be  over  than $600  million,  however. 
(Increased coarse grains deficiency payments  are higher  than those for wheat: 
$1.26 billion.) 
Figure  2  summarizes  the effect of the various  EEP  funding  levels on cumulative 
U.S.  wheat exports.  The  results are presented in terms  of ranges  implied by 
iterative model  solutions.  As  can be  seen and as  already discussed,  increased 
EEP  funding  leads  to  increased export levels.  The  largest export  increase is 
from  a  zero  EEP  funding  level  to  the minimum  base  level.  Increased funding 
clearly implies  diminishing gains. 
Effect of the  EEP  on  the  CAP 
EEP  is intended to place pressure  on  the  EC  to  reform its system of 
subsidizing exports.  As  explained earlier,  EC  grain policies effectively cut 
EC  prices  from  changes  in world prices.  Therefore,  the  primary way  that EEP 
affects the  EC  is through  increased budget exposure  for  the wheat  and coarse 
grain components  of the  CAP.  Model  results  indicate base level funding of EEP 
24 Figure  2 
Effect of EEP  on  U.S.  Wheat Exports 
Model results:  cumulative  total, 1991-95 
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25 increases  EC  wheat  and coarse grain export restitutions by $439.0 million or 
$0.23  per dollar expended on EEP.  Increased funding of the  EEP  assumed in 
Scenario  B  increases restitutions by $267.9 million,  or $0.18  per EEP  dollar. 
Increased EEP  funding  in 1993  and  1994 of a  total of a  billion dollars 
increases restitutions by  $94 million,  or $0.09  per  EEP  dollar.  These results 
indicate that the  EC  can counter  the effect of the  EEP  relatively cheaply, 
especially for  EEP  expenditure levels above  the base. 
Base  cumulative  EC  restitutions over  1991-95  are estimated at $13.3 billion. 
They rise to their highest level of $13.8 billion in Scenario  D.  These 
estimates  imply that an aggressive  EEP,  along with  a  relaxation of acreage 
reduction requirements,  can cause restitutions  to rise by no  more  than 4 
percent,  a  very modest  amount. 
Figure  5  shows  similar information diagrammatically:  the  range  of model 
estimates  for net  EC  wheat expenditure.  As  can be  seen,  there is very little 
differentiation between the scenarios.  Again,  the most  discernable effect is 
between the scenario with zero  EEP  funding  (scenario A)  and  the base. 
Conclusions 
Model  results  indicate that  EEP  funding at minimum  authorized levels  can be  an 
effective way  to  increase U.S.  wheat  exports  over  1991-95.  Funding at minimum 
levels set out in the  FACT  can be  expected to  increase cumulative wheat 
exports by  16 percent over that level likely with no  EEP.  However,  the program 
will be  subject to diminishing returns  for levels higher  than the minimum 
26 Figure  3 
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27 levels set in the  FACT.  An  EEP  used in conjunction with relaxed acreage 
reduction requirements has  the greatest potential for expanding exports,  but 
at the expense of increased deficiency payments  ($1.4 billion for both wheat 
and coarse grains). 
Results presented in this report are averages  derived from model  iterations, 
each of which differ according to underlying stochastic factors  affecting crop 
yields.  Other stochastic factors,  such as  exchange  rates and general  economic 
conditions,  are not accounted for  in this study.  Also,  in any particular year, 
market conditions may  make  an  EEP  a  more  or less efficient way  of promoting 
exports.  If such market variability is perceived to be  an important  influence, 
setting yearly minimum  or maximum  levels of EEP  funding may  not lead to  the 
most efficient use  of the  EEP.  A five-year  funding  level with flexibility on 
how  to allocate across years  may  produce better results,  although there is 
always  the  chance  that the period constraint will not be  taken seriously. 
This  report has  analyzed the  EEP  only in terms  of criteria established in the 
design of the program itself.  There has been no  attempt  to account  for  changes 
in producer or consumer welfare resulting from  the  EEP.  However,  if producers 
were  to  gain as  a  result of EEP,  it is likely that the welfare gain could have 
been achieved more  efficiently in some  other manner  than through  the  EEP.  It 
is useful  to note  that only under  a  very narrow set of conditions can it be 
shown  that a  targeted export subsidy program will produce  gains sufficient to 
offset losses  from  the program  (Abbott  and others,  1987). 
The  marginal cost to  the  EC  of countering the effects of the  EEP  will be 
28 relatively low.  Also,  given likely EEP  expenditure  levels,  it is unlikely that 
the  EEP  can cause  the level of  EC  export restitutions  to rise by more  than 4 
percent.  Other wheat  exporters will presumably bear the brunt of the program's 
effect on  the world wheat market. 
The  goal of the  EEP  to prod the  EC  into making  trade concessions  is not likely 
to be met by use of the  EEP  alone.  It may  be  that pressure for reform outside 
the agricultural sector will be needed to force  EC  agricultural reforms  in the 
context of the  GATT.  Also,  pressure  internal to  the  EC  from  ever-rising crop 
yields  and subsequent  increased budget expenditure  seems  to be  a  more  relevant 
factor  in promoting  EC  reform  than the  EEP. 
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31 Appendix:  Structure of the Model 
This  appendix describes  some  of the  important equations constituting the model 
used in this research.  It is not a  complete model  review.  In particular,  the 
Soviet component  is not described because it has little bearing on the 
modeling of the  EEP.  (It is implicitly assumed that the  EEP  influences  from 
whom  the Soviets purchase,  but not at what level.)  See  the  longer version of 
this paper:  ___ for  a  full model  description. 
United States Policy and Planted Acreage 
U.S.  producers  form price expectations  (EXPUS)  based on prior years'  prices 
(PUS): 
EXPUS=MIN[PUS(-l),  PUS(-l) +PUS(-2) +PUS(-3)  ] 
3 
Acreage planted is divided between participants and  the nonparticipants  in the 
government's  commodity programs.  The  model  calculates  the returns of 
participating  (EXP)  vis-a-vis not participating  (EXM),  and calculates  the rate 
of participation according to  a  logistic participation function estimated by 
Magiera: 
PART=  0:1 
0:2+EXP[0:3+0:4*( EXP)] 
EXM 
where  for wheat:  02  =  0.97,  03=  2.671,  04=  -2.415;  and for  coarse grains:  02-
1.266,  03- 7.071,  04  - -6.29. 
32 The  expected return to participation includes price support protection offered 
by the nonrecourse  loan mechanism  and deficiency payments  on eligible base 
acreage  (PFREE  - l-[ARP+FLEX]): 
EXP= [MAX(LR* (l-FDLY), EXPUS) *EXPECTEDYIELD*CONSTANT-EXPECTEDVARIABLECOSTS] 
* (PFREE+FLEX) + (EXPECTEDDEF) *PFREE 
The  nonparticipating return is the market return: 
EXM=EXPUS* (EXPECTEDYIELD) *  CONSTANT-EXPECTEDVARIABLECOST 
Target prices  (TP),  flex acreage  requirements  (FLEX),  and program yield  (PY) 
are  exogenous  and described in fuller detail in the  text and table 1.  ARP's 
and loan rates  (base  and Findley)  are set as  described in the  text.  It is 
assumed that the  10 percent discretionary portion of the  Findley rate is used, 
that is MIN(FDLY)  - .10. 
Set-aside land,  or land diverted from production  (SETSD)  is calculated: 
SETSD='t * [ARP*BASE*PART] 
where  T  is a  calibrating constant.  U.S.  planted acreage is therefore: 
PL(i)=PART*[BASE*(l-FLEX)-SETSD]+ 
+ (l-PART) * (1+ FLEX*PART) *4>*EXPUS(i) 0(1,1) *EXPUS(j) -o(l,j) 
1-PART 
i  WH,CG,SB 
j  CG,WH,SB  j  =  i;  and  ~ is a  model  constant. 
Harvested acreage is a  fixed proportion of acreage planted. 
33 EC  Policy and Planted Acreage 
EC  intervention prices are  assumed  to remain 179.44 ecu/mt  for wheat  and 
170.47  ecu/mt  for  coarse grain throughout  the  simulation period.  Threshold 
prices  remain at 245.68  ecu/mt for wheat  and  223.38  ecu/mt for coarse grains. 
EC  grain producers are assessed a  coresponsibility levy in order to help 
stabilize production.  The  base coresponsibility levy rate is 3  percent of the 
intervention price.  Producers  are assessed additionally if the  sum  of the 
previous year's  EC  wheat  and coarse grain production exceeds  160 million 
metric  tons.  The  percentage by which production exceeds  the  160 million metric 
ton level is added to  the base rate,  up  to  a  maximum  of 3  additional 
percentage points.  The  EC  incentive price becomes  the maximum  of the 
intervention price adjusted downward  by the coresponsibility levy and  the 
world price of the  commodity expressed in ecu's.  These  incentive prices 
determine  acreage harvested through  a  model  supply function in constant 
elasticity format: 
HR(i) =~*PEC(i)  ",(i.i) *PEC(j) -",(i.j) 
where  HR  is acreage harvested,  and  PEC  is the  EC  price. 
Production 
Actual production is subject to  random yield variations  about calculated, 
historically-based,  trends.  Yields  are multiplied by the producer-determined 
acreage harvested to  give production levels each year.  Each  model  iteration is 
based on  a  sequence of crop yields  over  1990  to  1995.  As  such,  the model  is 
stochastic.  The  model  solves  over  50  iterations as  shown  in figure  1. 
34 Wheat yields are calculated: 
YIELD ("WH") =EXYD("WH") +e ("WH") 
e ("WH") distributed:  n (0, VAR ("WH") ) 
where  EXYO  - expected yield.  Coarse  grain yields are calculated: 
YIELD ("CG") =a.+rl *  YIELD  (IIWH") +e (IICG", "WH") 
a.=EXYD("CG") -EXYD(IIWH") *p(ICG","WH") * ( STD(IICG") 
STD (IIWH") 
J3=P ("CG", "WH") * ( STD(IICG") 
STD (IIWH") 
e (II  CG"  ,IIWH") distributed:  n (0, [VAR (II  CG") * (1- (P (II  CG",IIWH") ) 2) ] ) 
where  VAR-variance,  STD=standard deviation,  and P=correlation coefficient. 
Area harvested in the  rest-of-the-world  (ROW)  is a  function of the previous 
year's prices as  follows: 
HR(i) =cf>*PRICE(i, -1) 0(1,1) *  PRICE (j  , -1) -o(1,j) 
where  PRICE(i,-l)  is the world price for  commodity  i  lagged one year. 
Production in each region is the product of acreage harvested and yield: 
35 Simultaneous  Block:  the United States 
U.S.  consumption is a  function of prices  (as well  as  an exogenous  growth 
factor related to population growth  --see text): 
CN(i) =4>*PUS(i) -,,(1.1) *PUS(j) ,,(1.j) 
Private ending stocks is a  function of the ratio of the  commodity's price to 
its expected price.  Private stocks  for either wheat  or coarse grains  cannot 
fall below pipeline levels:  10  mmt  for both commodities: 
ES("PRV") =MAX(4)* (  PUS  ) -p  10) 
EXPUS  ' 
CS("PRV") =ES("PRv") -BS("pRV") 
where  ES  -Ending Stocks,  PRV  -Private,  CS  -Carryover,  and  BS  =  Beginning 
Stocks. 
The  government  (GOVT)  stocks  equation consists of  two  parts: 
II. (1- HAX(PUS-LR· (l-FDLYl. 0) 
TP-LR. (l-FDLy)  )  1 
CS("GOVT") =MAX[ -EEPCERT+ [  e  - ] *PART*PR, -BS("GOVT")] 
e"-l 
where  p  is a  loan forfeiture coefficient. 
The  first part,  EEPCERT,  discussed in the text,  represents  the decrease  in 
stocks  due  to  in-kind EEP  bonus  payments.  The  second part represents  the 
accumulation of stocks  reSUlting  from  loan forfeitures  in the  government's 
nonrecourse  loan program.  The  mathematical specification of the  second part is 
highly nonlinear.  In the numerator of the  equation,  a  loan forfeiture 
36 coefficient  ~ is adjusted by one  less  a  fraction of the difference of the 
market price and loan rate over  the  difference of the target price and loan 
rate.  This part of the equation cannot be  greater than one  (which it will be 
when  the market price is less  than or equal  to  the  loan rate).  When  the market 
price is less  than or equal  to  the  loan rate,  total production of those 
participating in the government's  program is forfeited to  the  CCC;  that is, 
l*PART*PR.  For  a  market price higher  than the  loan rate,  only a  fraction of 
participants'  production will be forfeited.  The  loan forfeiture coefficient 
regulates  the  convexity of the forfeiture relationship.  The  larger the value 
of the coefficient,  the  less is forfeited at higher market prices  above  the 
loan rate.  The  value of  ~ has  not been directly estimated;  rather,  various 
values of the coefficient have been used in model  experiments.  The  resulting 
forfeiture relationships have been examined  in order to select a  reasonable 
coefficient value for model  use.  For both wheat  and coarse grains,  a 
coefficient value of 2.0 yielded reasonable results. 
Carryover stocks  equals  the  sum  of private and  government carryover.  Trade 
(TD)  is calculated as  a  residual: 
TD=PR-CN-CS 
Simultaneous  Block:  other regions  and market clearing 
EC  and  ROW  consumption are determined by constant elasticity demand  functions: 
CN(i) =<!>* PEC(i) -,,(1.1) *PEC(j) ,,(l.j) 
37 CN(i) =~*PRICE(i)  -'1(1,1) *PRICE(j) '1(1,j) 
ROW  carryover is constant.  EC  end period stocks are modeled as  function of the 
ratio of the period's world price to last period's world price.  (The  stock 
elasticity is set low relative to  the U.S.  elasticity:  -0.5  (Holland and 
Sharples,  1984».  EC  and  ROW  trade are calculated as  a  residuals: 
ES=~*  (  PRICE  ) -p 
PRICE(-l) 
TD=PR-CN-CS 
World market clearing conditions  in which world excess  grain demands  are 
driven to zero determine world grain prices.  U.S.  grain prices are equal  to 
world prices plus  EEP  price wedges,  examined earlier,  less fixed marketing 
margins,  which were  calculated on  the basis of 1989  relationships.  The  world 
price in ecu's  (ECU-P)  is the world price in U.S.  dollars  divided by  the 
ecu/U.S.  dollar exchange rate  (EXR).  (The  exchange  rate itself is a  constant. 
In the model,  it has been held at its average  1989 value  throughout  the 
simulation period): 
TD(IfUSIf) +TD(IfECIf) +TD(IfSV") +TD(IIRWIf) =0 
PUS=PRICE+  EEP-TDMARG 
where  SV  =  Soviet Union,  and  TDMARG  =  fixed marketing margin. 
ECU-P=PRICE/EXR 
38 Residual block:  budget calculations 
After the model  has been solved for  a  particular year,  model-calculated 
supplies,  trade,  and prices can be used to calculate budget expenditures 
implied by policy parameter values set in the predetermined model  block.  U.S. 
deficiency payments fit into this area.  More  extensive calculations are 
required for  EC  budget estimates  (Table  3).  Part of the problem for estimating 
EC  agricultural expenditures are  that they are based on levels of exports 
(restitutions)  and  imports  (variable levies)  rather than the net exports  the 
model  solves  for.  Therefore,  the model  contains relatively simple  linear wheat 
and coarse grain import  (M)  equations  estimated by Herlihy as part of the 
Magiera-Herlihy  ERS  model  described earlier.  Wheat  imports  are  a  negative 
function of  EC  wheat production,  and coarse grain imports  are  a  negative 
function of production and a  positive function of consumption.  Exports  (X)  are 
calculated as  the  sum  of net exports  and  imports: 
M("EC", "WH") =  CONSTANT- • 11739  *PR ("EC", "WH") 
M("EC" ,"CG") = CONSTANT- • 5087 O*PR ("EC", "CG") +.87546  *CN("EC", "CG") 
X("EC") =TD("EC") +M("EC") 
Variable levies are calculated as  the product of grain imports  and  the  gap 
between the  threshold price and ecu world price,  all times  a  calibrating 
constant calculated from  1989  EC  budget data.  Export restitutions are 
calculated as  the product of exports  and  the  gap  between the  intervention 
price and an ecu world reference price.  The  reference price is the model  world 
price multiplied by  a  constant which,  when used with  1989  data,  produces  the 
39 actual restitution level for  1989. 
Estimates of coresponsibility levies and  EC  storage payments  are based on 
model  estimates of production.  The  coresponsibility levy is the product of the 
level of production,  the  intervention price,  and the coresponsibility levy 
rate,  all times  a  calibrating constant.  Storage payments  are the product of 
the  level of production and  the  intervention price,  all times  a  fixed storage 
payment per unit production coefficient. 
The  gross  EC  budget  for  a  commodity,  as  reported by  the model,  is the  sum  of 
export restitutions and storage payments  for  that commodity.  The  net  EC  budget 
is the  gross budget less  import and coresponsibility levies extracted from 
imports  and production,  respectively. 
Limitations of Modeling Approach 
There  are several limitations in using this model  for  EEP  analysis.  Because 
the model  is highly aggregative,  it is impossible  to  incorporate all 
significant features  of the  EEP.  The  EEP  is  a  targeted subsidy program.  It is 
intended that EEP  subsidies  should help U.S.  exporters  displace exports of 
subsidizing competitors  in specific countries while having only minimal 
effects on nonsubsidizing competitors.  The  country/region coverage of the 
model  is not wide  enough  to accomplish this.  The  model  treats the  EEP  as 
though it were  a  uniform subsidy program.  Even if the  coverage were wider,  the 
tracking of bilateral trade  flows  would be difficult because wheat is modeled 
as  an undifferentiated good.  Wheat  could be  differentiated according to 
40 variety and/or country/region of origin,  but the cost would be high in terms 
of added model  complexity.  Estimation of import  demand  relationships  involving 
differing wheat varieties and origins has  in general produced ambiguous 
conclusions  that would prove hard to model  in any event  (Hjort,  1988). 
Another  consequence of the specification is the  inability to explicitly 
account for strategic importer behavior.  Large  importers potentially exercise 
market  power  when  making purchase decisions.  In a  market where  supplies are 
plentiful,  even small  importers play exporters off against each other in 
demanding  subsidies.  Because  an  implied EEP  intention is to direct bonuses  to 
countries where  the  EC  has  a  market presence,  countries may  be motivated to 
increase  EC  purchases just in order to become  a  more  likely target for  the 
EEP.  Withholding bonuses  from  longstanding customers  that may  engender ill 
will  from  them as well. 
The  Soviet component of the model  provides  a  good  context for discussion of 
these problems.  Although  the Soviet Union is the  largest EEP-assisted 
purchaser of U.S.  wheat,  its role  in the model  does little for understanding 
the  dynamics  of the  EEP.  Soviet  import  demand  is not modeled as  a  function of 
price.  Its demand  is rather a  function of deviations of production from  trend 
growth and of share parameters which allocate  the  deviation among  consumption, 
stocks,  and  imports.  Implicitly,  price might determine  from  whom  the Soviets 
purchase,  but this  information in a  net trade model  where  wheat  is an 
undifferentiated good does  not  influence model  results.  An  added area of 
research that could prove useful is the effect of foreign exchange  constraints 
on Soviet wheat purchasing behavior.  Currently this  information is embedded in 
41 the share parameters  referred to above.  Doubtlessly these parameters  change 
through time.  Parameter values  could be  influenced by the availability of 
price subsidies offered by exporters,  as well as credit guarantees  like those 
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